Knowledge of Echolocation, p. 6 example, your own experience in walking down a long, tiled hallway. With each step, a small burst of noise radiates from your shoe's contact with the floor into the area around you. In hearing this, you hear not only the shoe striking the floor but also the reflections of that sound from surrounding surfaces. If the space were much different -if, say, you were taking a few steps across the tile of a bathroom floor -your acoustic experience would be noticeably different. For example, there is an obvious echoic difference that makes you sound like Pavarotti in the shower, and you everywhere else. Hallways and showers sound different. They do so not because hallways and showers produce sound but because they reflect sound differently. In reacting to the acoustic differences between the two, one is using echoic information.
While our primary mode of perceiving in our daily, sighted lives, is not echolocatory, we do constantly seem to use echoic information as a supplement to vision.
If what we think to be a concert hall does not sound like a concert hall or what we think to be a hallway does not sound like a hallway, we will detect that difference. Imagine stepping through a doorway into a familiar tile hallway, visually focusing to the left, and being surprised by the sound of one's footstep. Turning right, one discovers a large piece of furniture where there was none before. In such a case, echoic information has been used to guide visual attention. While moving through the world, we constantly use echolocatory information to assess our physical surroundings and elicit the appropriate behavioral adjustments in response.
Wenger Corporation has developed what they call a "virtual room." This room is able to synthesize the acoustics of a variety of spaces, from an office to a symphony hall (something that practicing musicians have found quite useful More research is needed, however, to determine precisely what sorts of echoic information sighted people respond to and how capable we are in using it.
The Poor Quality of Our Knowledge of the Phenomenology of Echolocation.
It seems to us that there is something it is like to echolocate, i.e., that there is a conscious phenomenology of echolocation, that just as an orange presents a different visual phenomenology than a grape, so also a hallway presents a different echoic phenomenology than a shower. If we are wrong about this matter, that only makes more plausible our ultimate point: that people can be vastly wrong about their own conscious experience.
Close your eyes and try to echolocate your hand while holding it in front of your face. Make hissing noises or repeat a favorite syllable, and move your hand closer to Knowledge of Echolocation, p. 8 your mouth and farther way, right and left, up and down. In doing this, you can tell something about where your hand is from the differences in sound; you are echolocating.
We hope you'll agree that there is something it is like to do that -not just something it is like to move your hand, to make noises, and to hear your own voice, but something it is like to get a sense of where your hand is from the changes in the reflected sound as it moves. You have an auditory experience of your hand as being closer or farther away, to the right or to the left. Although not as vivid as visual experience, echolocation is an important, pervasive, and distinctive feature of our sensory phenomenology.
It is interesting, then, to see how grossly mistaken people can be about it. Nagel, as quoted at the beginning of this paper, goes so far as to claim not only that we do not echolocate as the bat does, but also that the bat's sonar "is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess." 10 Maybe all Nagel means is that the bat's echolocation is so vastly better than ours as to warrant description as different in kind. Yet, Nagel puts his point more strongly than would seem to be warranted if that were his view. And Nagel is not alone in his apparent failure to recognize the human capacity for echolocation. If the initial reactions of subjects in the second author's experiments 11 and reactions from colleagues in cognitive science and philosophy can be used as a guide, a significant proportion of the adult population will deny that we can detect object properties (e.g., size, texture, distance) by attending to patterns of reflected sound.
One might think that the blind, whose abilities at echolocation are generally considered superior to those of sighted people, and who often use echolocation quite actively to avoid objects in novel environments, would be immune to such errors, but that is not the case. For example, one of the two blind subjects in Supa and his colleagues'
Schwitzgebel & Gordon to have thought that although we may be radically mistaken in our judgments about things external to our minds, we cannot be mistaken in reporting our own mental states (or at least our own current conscious experiences if we reflect attentively upon them). It may be that a person who believes she is staring at red tomato is not staring at a red tomato at all -she may, instead, be having a drug-induced hallucination of a tomato, or she may have had her brain removed the previous night and teleported to a vat on Alpha Centauri where evil neuroscientists are stimulating her visual cortex in such a way as to mimic exactly the experience of seeing a red tomato. Although these scenarios may be unlikely, it is often granted that they are possible. She may be mistaken in thinking that she is seeing a red tomato. However, there is one thing about which it might appear she cannot be mistaken: that she is having a subjective or phenomenal experience of "redness."
Many philosophers since have found plausible a "Cartesian" view of this sort: We cannot be mistaken about, or be brought sincerely to doubt, the subjective quality of our own current, conscious experience. 15 Although recently this view has fallen into disfavor, the philosophers who repudiate it typically seem to suppose that our knowledge of our current conscious experiences is nonetheless quite accurate. 16 They often rely on We think it plausible to say that, at least in some cases, people are making such a big mistake. However, let's examine a few of the more appealing alternative hypotheses that might come to mind. We will argue that they all have significant weaknesses.
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(1. ) First, let's consider the possibility that the phenomenon could be explained wholly by a failure of people to attend to their own experience. Perhaps people deny echolocating simply because they have never bothered to focus on that aspect of audition.
If so, then a certain sort of Cartesian view, one in which the perceiver is accurate when he actively attends to his phenomenology, could be supported. This proposal gains some plausibility from the fact that certain tests (e.g., the hand-in-front-of-the-face demonstration) that draw our attention to the echolocatory aspects of auditory experience -at least when presented as tests of echolocation -do cause most people to recognize an echolocation experience.
We grant that our ignorance of echolocation, especially in the case of normal, sighted subjects, has a lot to do with not carefully attending to patterns of change in our auditory phenomenology. Once one does start regularly attending to the acoustic changes that occur within a normal echoic environment, the experience of echolocation starts to seem both obvious and pervasive. However, for several reasons we do not think failure to attend can wholly explain our ignorance of echolocation. First, it is rather odd to suppose that most people never attend to a major and persistent feature of their auditory experience (especially if one is willing to grant -as we are not -another view associated with Descartes, that it is by knowledge of our experience that we gain knowledge of the would outside of us). Second, blind subjects who claimed to detect the presence of obstacles by facial vision rather than by echolocation were attending to their auditory
Schwitzgebel & Gordon
September 25, 2000 Knowledge of Echolocation, p. 12 experience, presumably alert for changes in it that might signal the approach of an obstacle, and nonetheless continued to make the mistake. Finally, these same subjects not only claim not to echolocate, but also claim to feel pressure on their faces. (Several of the sighted subjects in the Rosenblum, Gordon, and Jarquin study claimed a similar thing when questioned about their experiences. 19 ) This is not a failure to notice something to which they are not attending, but rather a confabulation of something new, and thus requires a different explanation. However, the mistake of the naïve subject who denies that she is echolocating cannot be a simple mistake of this sort. She not only will refuse to accept the term 'echolocation' to describe her experience, but also will deny that she can detect the properties of silent objects by attending to the sounds they reflect when that claim is couched in language she clearly understands. If her mistake is a verbal mistake of reportage, a more complex story needs to be told.
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For example, a person may be able to recognize the difference between the experience of hearing a middle-C played with one timbre (characteristic of a flute, say) and another middle-C similar in all respects except for the timbre (characteristic of a trumpet). This person may not know the word 'timbre' and may find implausible the idea that he could be sensitive to those sorts of differences in the overtone series. In denying that he is sensitive to timbre, he is making a mistake about what stimuli in the environment move him to have different experiences, but he is not making a mistake about his experiences themselves. He knows darn well the difference in auditory experience between the two tones.
However, the echolocation case is not like that. The echolocating subject does not recognize that there are different auditory experiences resulting from the distinct reflective patterns of objects divergent in shape or distance. When asked whether the experience of hearing a flute is any different from the experience of hearing a trumpet, our skeptic about timbre will say yes; but he will deny the analogous difference in the echolocation case. As discussed above, this is not simply a matter of failing to attend, since subjects make these mistakes even when attending to their auditory experiences and attempting to assess whether there are any changes in them that might serve as the basis for distance judgments. The person who fails to notice significant features of her sensory experience (and perhaps even confabulates other features such as facial pressure) is not merely a making a verbal mistake or a mistake about the physical causes of her experience. She is making an error about the experience itself. Knowledge of Echolocation, p. 14 by any sort of higher-level processing about (say) the positions of objects, or it might incorporate higher-level information, but not echolocatory information -at least not in such a way that it is right to say that there is a phenomenology of echolocation. Our echolocatory capacities, on this view, are the consequence of unconscious inferences our perceptual system makes on the basis of auditory input but does not incorporate into the sensory experience itself. Thus, subjects who report no experience of echolocation are reporting their phenomenology accurately.
Such a view, however, may not help the reliabilist about introspection. Although it renders accurate those who deny any experience of echolocation, it correspondingly renders inaccurate those who claim that there is such an experience. Unless the reliabilist can explain away the latter assertion as merely an error of words (see (2) above), such an error would seem to be an error of the sort the reliabilist disallows.
In any case, this view draws an unlikely picture of our sensory experience. We do not, most philosophers and psychologists would now say, experience the world as raw, unprocessed sense-data on the basis of which we make inferences about how things are.
Rather, higher-level processes affect the sensory experiences themselves. The senses present the world as being a certain way. The experience of seeing a blue book, for example, is not just the experience of having a raw, blue sense-datum in part of one's visual field; it is the experience of seeing some object as being in some location.
Illusions and ambiguous figures show this point nicely. We experience the ambiguous figure as a drawing of an old or a young woman, or we experience the illusion of depth in a two-dimensional figure, because those figures are visually experienced not simply as black and white blobs but as parts of a rich world of objects. Auditory experience, too, is properties (e.g., a certain distance and direction from the observer). Once we are familiar with the phenomenon of echolocation, it seems odd to say that we have an auditory experience of the distance and direction of sound sources only and not of silent objects.
If your ear is near a wall or your hand is near your mouth, part of your auditory experience is of something nearby in that space. Failing to notice echolocation is simply failing to notice that part of your auditory experience.
Finally, like the first alternative explanation, this explanation does not address the apparent error of those who claim to experience pressure. First, although perceivers may subjectively experience a stimulus in a modality other than the one in which the stimulus was initially presented (an effect known as synaesthesia), such occurrences appear to be unusual. 20 Furthermore, it is unclear why some blind people would experience pressure on the face in the looming presence of a wall while others report auditory sensations. Are we to suppose that they have entirely divergent thalamic projections for the same sensations? At least two blind subjects became convinced as a consequence of experiments cited above that the alleged facial pressures were imaginary.Knowledge of Echolocation, p. 16 experiences, then those experiences must somehow have changed sensory modality during the course of the experiments. Echolocation in sighted people obviously creates analogous difficulties. Why should some sighted people experience echolocation and others fail to, when it seems unlikely that there is any gross neurophysiological difference between the two groups? It is also suspicious that people can pass from claiming they do not experience echolocation to claiming that they do in a matter of minutes. If such claims reflect a genuine change in opinion about the experiences, then the synaesthetic effect must dissipate quite rapidly. But it seems odd to suppose that the sensations can so quickly be rerouted from one modality to another. Are we to suppose that subjects spend their whole lives experiencing echolocation not at all, or as pressure, and then after some bit of formal experimentation shift to experiencing it in a dramatically different way?
What would cause such a radical change in sensory experience? (And what would the reliabilist make of a case in which the purported change went completely unnoticed, the subject reporting, instead, that she had been mistaken in her previous assessment and echolocating all along?)
It may be tempting to defend the reliabilist's view here by suggesting that differences in expectations are responsible for the differences in experience -i.e., that those who expect to feel pressure will, in consequence, experience pressure and that those who expect auditory experiences will have those instead. There is some plausibility to the hypothesis that expectations can substantially affect one's sensory experience. But even if we grant that the expectation, say, of hearing a child cry in the distance can affect one's auditory experience so that it seems as though a cry has occurred, or the expectation of a certain flavor in the wine subtly changes how the wine tastes, the what we know only by uncertain and unreliable inference are our own mental states, including our current, conscious phenomena. 22 Not only are we pervasively mistaken about the experience of echolocation, but we make vast and frequent mistakes about our sensory experience in other modalities, about our moods and emotions, about our imagery and dreams, about our cognition and desires. Even though we echolocate, Nagel
